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Matthias Zachmann
Ungentle Civilizer: Treaties and Colonial War in 
19th Century International Law
Dieser Beitrag steht unter einer
Creative Commons cc-by-nc-nd 3.0 
erwachsenen Druck hatte sich der Eigentümer, der 
ja zugleich Marktteilnehmer war, zu fügen« (214). 
Auch diese Auswahl von Zitaten ist nicht voll-
ständig, das Stichwortverzeichnis in dieser Hin-
sicht aber besonders erhellend, insb. auf Seite 252.
Der Verzicht auf alle Arten von Dogmen-, Insti-
tutionen- und sonstige Kontinuitätsgeschichten ist 
ebenso richtig wie der Abschied von der »grossen 
Dichotomie« (99ff.), welcher der Rezensent noch 
die »kleine Dichotomie« von Germanisten und 
Romanisten hinterherwerfen will, über die Caroni 
nicht nur auf Seite 11ff. mit leisem Spott äussert. 
Selbstverständlich ist sein Blick auf die Sozialge-
schichte der ertragreichere und sein Postulat nach 
Erforschung der Wirkungsgeschichte des Gesetzes 
zweifellos begründet. Die Tragweite des »Markt-
arguments« hält der Rezensent ehrlicherweise für 
eher beschränkt. Entscheidend ist vielmehr das 
Gesamtbild, nämlich wie vielschichtig, bewegt 
und detailreich Caroni die Geschichte des Privat-
rechts darstellt. Er belegt damit abermals, dass sich 
auf einem kleinen Raum mit weniger als drei 
Millionen Einwohnern in der Schweiz im 19. Jahr-




Ungentle Civilizer: Treaties and Colonial War in 
19th Century International Law*
Already Plato in the Republic had his protago-
nists muse about the application of the law of war – 
or its customary predecessor – to different groups 
of adversaries, notably fellow-Hellenes and outside 
»barbarians«. Among the former, Socrates argued, 
»civilized« rules should apply, particularly the pro-
tection of non-combatants and the rejection of a 
scorched earth policy. Towards barbarians, how-
ever, the ideal citizen should behave »like the 
Hellenes do among themselves today«,1 hinting 
at the sorry state of warfare in reality even among 
Greeks at the time. Interestingly, Plato did not 
address the case when »barbarians« came under 
the rule of a Greek state, arguably because the ideal 
republic saw no room for such expansion.
For a long time, the states of Europe did not 
trouble themselves with this last problem, either 
because they were too weak to project their power 
overseas or they themselves were the objects of 
threat or occupation. Only with the discovery of 
the Americas and the beginning of European 
expansion in the 15th and 16th century did this 
become a relevant problem (coinciding with the 
rise of modern international law as a distinct field 
of knowledge); it became particularly pressing in 
the age of high imperialism during the 19th and 
early 20th century. 
In the monograph under review, Harald Klein-
schmidt thus addresses one of the most pressing 
problems in international law during this last 
phase of western expansion. The questions that 
animate his study are as follows (35): How did 
scholars of international law legitimize the fact 
that European powers and the US ignored valid 
treaties with non-western nations during the ex-
pansion? How did military and legal experts ex-
plain excluding colonial warfare from the concept 
of regular warfare? And finally, how did these 
conceptual and theoretical developments shape 
international relations at the time?
Based on a host of primary sources in the fields 
of military science and international law (mostly 
* H K, Diskrimi-
nierung durch Vertrag und Krieg: 
Zwischenstaatliche Verträge und der 
Begriff des Kolonialkriegs im 19. und 
frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Discrimina-
tion by treaty and war: international 
treaties and the concept of colonial 
war in the 19th century and early 
20th century), Munich: Oldenbourg 
2013, 237 p., ISBN 978-3-486-71730-3
1 Plato, Politeia, Book V, 471–473.
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by British and German authors) and employing 
admirable erudition and attention to detail, Klein-
schmidt sets out to answer these questions in three 
main parts. The first part of the study is devoted to 
the state of law prior to the 19th century (38–60), 
the second part focuses on the discriminating 
treaty practice and concepts of national sovereignty 
and equality during the era of imperialism (61–
112), whereas the third part deals with the question 
of the consequences for warfare with colonized 
peoples or »protectorates« (113–169).
In summary, Kleinschmidt’s argument runs as 
follows: Prior to the 19th century, European inter-
national public law acknowledged a whole array of 
different types of international actors, including 
such non-state actors with legal personality as the 
British and Dutch Trading Companies. The con-
cept of international order was relatively static, and 
peace, not conflict, was the default state of their 
relationship. Consequently European public law 
was still rather indiscriminate in accepting non-
western nations as legal entities and valid parties of 
international treaties, and extended the full bene-
fits of the ius in bello (not to speak of ius ad bellum) 
to these nations. 
This began to change, however, around the 
turn of the 18th century and the tendencies accel-
erated towards the end of the 19th century. The 
outburst of revolution and war in Europe as well as 
the dynamics of the industrial revolution led to a 
new dynamic in the international order and a 
deepening of hierarchy among the powers. Legal 
theory reflected these developments by increas-
ingly limiting the number of entities that would 
qualify as sovereign subjects in law, ultimately 
declaring the state as the original subject in inter-
national law. What constituted a state was, of 
course, again a matter of definition that oen 
enough took the great western powers as their 
model.
In this context European states and the US 
treated non-western nations in a number of dis-
criminatory ways: by concluding so-called »un-
equal treaties« which lacked reciprocity and one-
sidedly favoured the western parties; establishing 
colonies in many of these states that, technically, 
were declared »protectorates«, but le little of the 
former state sovereignty; and finally, by declaring 
even those states as non-existent, due to the alleged 
lack of ability of the people to govern themselves. 
All this was done with the usual imperialist jus-
tification of »civilization« or the lack thereof. 
Kleinschmidt clearly shows how international law-
yers translated this process into legal theory and 
thus made themselves the handmaidens of impe-
rialist expansion, particularly through Lassa Op-
penheim’s artificial differentiation of state sover-
eignty, which should formally remain with non-
western states, and legal personality, i.e. the ca-
pacity to constitute effective legal acts, which non-
western states were still too immature to do. Thus, 
non-western states lacked legal personality and 
became mere »legal objects«, although it should 
be mentioned that, because of the vicissitudes and 
diversity of European colonial policies, there was 
never a consolidated or consistent theory and 
contradiction abounds.
Depriving non-western states of their legal per-
sonality and, in more extreme cases, of their quality 
as states per se had critical consequences in cases of 
military conflict between colonial governments 
and non-western nations. In the same way as 
non-western nations were declared unfit to govern 
themselves, they were also seen as incapable of 
fighting a »civilized« war with the military tech-
niques of western states, of which the guerrilla-
style warfare that non-western nations oen uti-
lised against their oppressors seemed proof. Being a 
non-state, they therefore lacked a ius ad bellum
against »their« government, and due to fighting 
an unlawful »small war« – as colonial wars came to 
be known because of the asymmetry of power in 
these conflicts – they were not extended the bene-
fits of the ius in bello. Thus, with the limitation of 
legal personality to »regular« states came the ex-
clusion of non-western nations from the protec-
tion of the laws of war. Instead, western troops 
resorted to the tactics of so-called »razzias« – 
arguably the colonial equivalent to guerrilla war-
fare – or »expeditions« against the colonial popu-
lation, the most notorious characteristic of which 
was that they did not distinguish between combat-
ants and non-combatants and thus victimised 
whole populations. This culminates in Klein-
schmidt’s verdict that »with its inherent limitation 
of the concept of war to conflicts between states, 
international law committed so-called ›savage‹, 
›half-savage‹ or ›uncivilized‹ peoples to lawless 
massacres« (33) and that »even unpardonable acts 
of violence and genocide could became unprob-
lematic measures under international law, even if, 
as in the case of the war against the Herero and 
Nama, these violated municipal, in this case Ger-
man, law« (172).
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Although the insight that international law and 
military science, as much as any other field of 
knowledge, was not free of politics but, on the 
contrary, directly or indirectly lent itself to the 
imperialist project, is not new and has arguably 
even become the default expectation in historiog-
raphy in the past decades, Kleinschmidt’s study is 
nonetheless fresh and important in that it focuses 
on the critical doctrinal link between sovereignty, 
state personality and the application of the law of 
war, particularly towards non-western nations. It is 
also valuable in that it directs our attention to 
further fields of inquiry that need much more 
work. Thus, it could be argued that the term 
»unequal treaty« is a subjective one and would 
have to be confirmed by a corresponding feeling 
of iniquity on the part of the non-western nation. 
So for example, it seems somewhat formalistic to 
declare the treaty between Britain and the King of 
Bonny as »unequal« (78), just because it did not 
grant the same rights to the King if the latter felt no 
need for them (which we do not know). Likewise, 
Kleinschmidt’s case studies of the Kingdom of 
Buganda and the Ashanti (145–168) do not always 
bear his own analysis, but hint at even further 
diversity in the details: when Britain considered 
merging Buganda into a bigger union, the kabaka
of Buganda could insist on the treaty of 1900 which 
prohibited any changes in the status of the king-
dom (151), demonstrating that treaties could bene-
fit non-western states, provided the political situa-
tion was right. Also, Kleinschmidt argues that the 
implicit assumption of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, which came with the conclusion of the 
treaties, and the requirement of its written form 
constituted an imposition of European public law 
on the non-western side (84–87). Apart from the 
fact that any other form than the written seems 
impractical for international treaties, the problem 
here seems less the imposition than the misunder-
standings that the implied principles created, as the 
case of the Ashanti demonstrates. Here, the succes-
sive ruler did not seem to have felt bound by a 
treaty that was not concluded by him but by his 
predecessor as representative of the state as a legal 
person (165). Again, this example illustrates the 
necessity to know much more about the interpre-
tation of international law on the non-western side.
However, the most important vista is opened up 
by Kleinschmidt’s verdict on the notorious com-
plicity of international law with state-perpetrated 
crimes, as it points towards the problem of doc-
trine, historical context and the standards we apply. 
Thus the verdict ignores that traditional interna-
tional law at the time did not concern itself with 
domestic atrocities, and seems to apply a somewhat 
anachronistic standard. If we take the legal doc-
trine of the time seriously, then it is on the surface 
consistent to argue that protectorates are part of 
the extended interior of the sovereign state. As 
such, it would be nonsensical from a publicist’s 
point of view to postulate a ius ad bellum for the 
local population, and again consistent to treat its 
uprising as rebellion. However, traditional interna-
tional law does not concern itself with such ›in-
ternal affairs‹, but leaves dealing with this to the 
municipal law of the sovereign state. Thus, in 
principle, international law does not ›outlaw‹ co-
lonial people, but simply declares itself not com-
petent and pushes the responsibility into another 
legal sphere. As Kleinschmidt concedes, the Herero 
and Namaqua genocide violated municipal, in this 
case German law. Thus, on the surface neither 
international nor municipal law condoned the 
atrocities as such, and we need to know much 
more about the legal status of protectorates and 
colonial people in municipal law, and its unholy 
conjunction with ideology, to understand the dy-
namics that led to such atrocities.
One could argue that pushing away the respon-
sibility was already a tacit complicity which le 
entire populations defenceless and at the mercy of 
possibly murderous governments. But it was only 
the postwar period that saw the rise of instruments 
that addressed this problem, notably the concept of 
»crimes against humanity« and the human rights 
regime. It would be anachronistic to demand the 
same standards from 19th century legal scholar-
ship. Moreover, the ambiguous status of »crimes 
against humanity« and legal issues in the »war on 
terror«, which eerily recall the »small wars« in 
Kleinschmidt’s study, show that these problems 
persist. Conversely, when considering the debates 
over the »responsibility to protect« in our time, we 
should not judge too harshly about such muddled 
interactions as Kleinschmidt describes in the case 
of the Ashanti. Nevertheless, one of the many 
merits of this thoughtful study is to make the 
reader aware of how deeply these problems of 
sovereignty and war are ingrained in the history 
of the international legal order.
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